The Necessity of Contingency.

Suppose (for reductio) that there are no contingent facts. Then, it would be true that “no contingent facts obtain.” Since it isn’t a necessary truth that no contingent facts obtain, this would be a contingent fact. Therefore, it is logically necessary that there be contingent facts, or else it is logically impossible that any fact be contingent.

So, either all facts are necessary (i.e., modal collapse), or it is a necessary fact that there is at least one contingent fact. There is a necessary fact N which is just the infinitely long disjunction of all logically possible contingent propositions {C1 v C2 v C3 v… Cn,}, including the contingent proposition that no other contingent facts obtain.

 

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One thought on “The Necessity of Contingency.

  1. In response to myself: What I say at the end must be revised, I think, in light of the fact that any one contingent proposition necessarily implies indefinitely many other contingent propositions, as C1 entails C2: “that C1 is true” and C2 entails C3: “that both C1 and C2 are true” and so on. So, I will have to say that “there is a necessary fact N which is just the infinitely long disjunction of all logically possible first-order contingent propositions {C1 v C2 v C3 v… Cn,}, including the contingent proposition that no other first-order contingent facts obtain.”

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