A Scientistic argument for Determinism, and some related thoughts

I would like to write a little bit, today, about Determinism. First, I want to try to give another argument for determinism which occurred to me recently (though I think it is a very poor argument, but may be worth mentioning if for no other reason than that it is some kind of argument for determinism). Following this I wish to draw on a thought experiment presented by Alexander Pruss to show that libertarian free will can be consistently combined with physical determinism.

What arguments are there for determinism? Let us take determinism to be the thesis that for any even E, E either follows of causal necessity from some prior (or posterior) event(s), or else from E every event follows of causal necessity. To avoid trouble, let us stipulate that no two events are both simultaneous and non-identical (i.e., events are complete states of affairs at a moment). Obviously the reason I used ‘causal’ necessity in the definition, as opposed to logical necessity, is that at any time t1, plausibly there is a future-tense (or past-tense) fact about any time t1+n (where n can be negative), so that at least one proposition at any time (and thus for any E) will logically entail every other proposition at every other time. Even the libertarian accepts that, so we should be careful not to conflate that with determinism.

I have said previously that I can think of one argument for a modest kind of determinism which would still be strong enough to rule out libertarian free will; 1) that human beings are entirely material entities, 2) that all material entities are governed entirely by deterministic physical laws, and therefore 3) human beings are determined to act and think exactly as they do act and think. I mentioned that this argument seems implausible to me for two reasons; first, that human beings are not plausibly entirely material entities,[1] and second that the laws of physics are not actually deterministic.[2] However, notice that this argument, even if it were sound, would not go as far as to entail that determinism per se is true (but only that physical determinism is true), nor would it give us any justificatory reason(s) for believing that determinism is true. Additionally, the restriction to physical determinism may actually undermine determinism per se. On determinism per se, even the universe is deterministically caused to begin to exist (assuming it does so), but on physical determinism there is no physical determinant responsible for the beginning of space, time, energy and matter. Physical determinism would, then, imply that materialism (and anything like it) is false, or that determinism per se is false. That’s a hard bullet for the champion of scientism to bite.

Here’s a more ambitious argument for determinism:

  1. Determinism is a necessary presupposition of the scientific method.
  2. The scientific method is the only, or in any case the best, avenue to genuine discovery (i.e., the finding of truth, since a discovery of something false is not a genuine discovery).
  3. Therefore, the presupposition of determinism is a necessary condition of the only, or in any case the best, avenue to genuine discovery (i.e., to the truth).
  4. For any P, if P is a presupposition necessary for the only, or in any case the best, avenue to genuine discovery, then P ought to be believed.
  5. Therefore, determinism ought to be believed.
  6. For any P, if P ought to be believed then P is true (i.e., nothing untrue ought to be believed).
  7. Therefore, determinism is true.

We might call this a presuppositionalist argument for determinism. If it were sound then it would provide us with a good reason to believe that determinism is true.[3]

Is this argument any good? Unsurprisingly, I think not. To start off, the first premise seems dubious, especially in light of the same points I made in response to the last argument for determinism which I examined – namely that quantum mechanics may not be deterministic (and yet clearly indeterministic theories of quantum mechanics are scientific, whether or not they are possibly true), and even Newtonian mechanics is certainly not deterministic (and yet, again, is clearly scientific, regardless of whether it is true, or even possibly true – scientific theories can suggest metaphysical impossibilities without ceasing to be scientific). The second premise is also problematic in my view, since it seems to me to simply enunciate the prejudice of scientism, which we have no good reasons for accepting, along with very good reasons for rejecting. So, I outright reject both of the first two premises of this argument.

I also think there are significant problems with the sixth premise which, even though I accept it, seems dubious on the assumptions of determinism and scientism. If determinism is correct, that seriously threatens the possibility of genuine ethics, including the ethics of belief, and if scientism is true then we have no good reason for believing that there are no false beliefs which we ought to adopt (for instance, if scientism and determinism are true, maybe I ought to believe that I am free in a morally relevant sense, even though, in fact, I am not and cannot be – or, paradoxically, if determinism/scientism are true, then, possibly, I ought not to believe that they are true). The whole reason for thinking that a belief ought to be believed if and only if it is true is based on a kind of metaphysical conception of truth on which truth, beauty and goodness are, we might say, ‘natural siblings.’ This makes perfect sense on the Christian way of seeing things, as well as many (perhaps most) other worldviews, but it does not make much sense on materialism or naturalism (which scientism enjoins on us). I’m not even sure it makes much sense on any non-materialist, but yet deterministic, view of the world (like the Calvinist worldview).[4]

Returning to the topic of physical determinism, I would now like to talk about an illustration I found in Pruss’ writing which helps to show that physical determinism is logically compatible with libertarian free will. Pruss uses the image of a cannonball flying through the air to clarify the difference between the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and what he calls the “Hume-Edwards-Campbell Principle” (HECP). According to the HECP, if each member of an infinite set could be explained in terms of the preceding member(s) then (i) every member of the set would be explained, and (ii) the set itself would stand in need of no additional explanation. The HECP is sometimes used as a response to cosmological arguments from contingency, for obvious reasons. Hume, for instance, writes:

Add to this that in tracing an eternal succession of objects it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can anything that exists from eternity have a cause[?]… In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts”[5]

This principle is, I believe, demonstrably wrong for several reasons, though my favorite demonstration is provided by Pruss who proves that an infinite series of successive explanations is logically equivalent to one great big viciously circular explanation. However, my interest here is not to find out whether the HECP is correct, but how thinking through the HECP can help make clear how physical determinism is compatible with libertarian free will.

To illustrate the difference, let’s imagine that there were a cannonball flying through the air in a logically possible world where there was no time at which the cannonball was not flying through the air. Every point in time at which the cannonball was in a certain place, going a certain speed in a particular direction, those facts could all be explained by pointing to facts about where a cannonball was (how fast it was going, and in what direction it was moving) at a preceding point in time (at least presuming the regularity of its motion, which is to say that its motion is governed by certain laws). For Hume (et al) it would make no sense to ask for an explanation over and above this for the fact that there is a cannonball flying through the air; we can explain why the cannonball exists, why it is moving as fast as it is, and why it is going in this direction rather than that direction, all by referring to facts about the laws governing its movement along with the fact that it existed, where it was, how fast it was moving, and in what direction it was going at some previous time. Where the HECP makes any further explanation unnecessary, the PSR demands that there be an explanation for why there is a cannonball at all, for the PSR demands that there be an explanation of any contingent fact.

Keeping this distinction in mind, let us imagine a logically possible world W which had no beginning, but was just stretched out temporally infinitely in its past, and in which physical determinism is true. At any point in time in W, W could be said to have existed for an infinite number of some unit of temporal length (hours, days, milliseconds, etc.), call this unit T, so that it had no beginning in the sense that there is no first T in W.[6] Now, for any state of affairs in W picked out by any time tn, all the facts about that state of affairs can be explained by the facts which obtain in W at a slightly earlier time tn-1. So, for any state of affairs at any time in W, there is an adequate explanation for that state of affairs in terms of some other state of affairs at another time which deterministically brings it about. In W, the HECP is satisfied by the facts we have laid out, whereas the PSR requires a deeper explanation for the existence of W, and for contingent facts obtaining in W. The PSR reminds us that such explanations are possible, and this will help us to see that libertarian free will possibly coincides with physical determinism.

Bear in mind that all we need to do in order to demonstrate the compossibility of two propositions is to show that there is a logically possible world out there which satisfies both propositions. In W, physical determinism is satisfied. If in/at W there is at least one libertarian-free act (or, technically, even just one libertarian-free agent), then the compossibility of libertarian free will and physical determinism will have been logically demonstrated. Clearly, however, it is logically possible that the existence of W is explained by the voluntary election of a libertarian-free divine agent (i.e., God). If God, in a libertarian-free capacity, chose to create such a world, then the world and all of its happenings would ultimately be explained in terms of God’s acting freely to create it. Thus, physical determinism is clearly logically compatible with libertarian free will. This is because God is, ex hypothesi, not a material entity. Suppose, further, that people are not merely material entities (i.e., the mind is immaterial), but that epiphenomenalism is true of all embodied people, and the mind, which persists after bodily death, becomes libertarian free once freed of the body. So long as this is logically possible its very possibility goes to show that physical determinism is demonstrably logically compatible with libertarian freedom.

However, there may be another way in which libertarian free will is compatible with physical determinism, at least on the B-theory of time. Suppose that there is a set of physical states of affairs P, consisting of {P1, P2, P3… Pn}. Now, suppose that any Pn+1 follows from Pn of causal necessity (for closed physical systems).  Every physical state of affairs in P is causally explained by some other physical state of affairs in P. Nevertheless, it is logically possible that the sufficient reason for a state of affairs in P involves the fact that a libertarian-free agent in that world makes a libertarian-free decision Fn at some time tn. Here, we might schematize this relationship as follows:

P1 → P2 → P3 → P4
↑↑↑↑       ↑↑↑↑
F1           F2

So, although P2 is physically-causally explained (i.e., HECP explained) by P1, P1 and P2 may only be sufficiently explained (i.e., PSR explained) by appeal to F1 (which itself is sufficiently explained just in case it is logically possible that facts about libertarian-free acts can be sufficiently explained).[7] It may seem strange to talk about libertarian-free acts which occur, in some sense, independently of their space-time context (for, if they occurred within that context, then physics, as we’re imagining it, would provide the context and impetus for the decision, along with determining the decision), but certainly that’s no stranger than thinking of God’s choices as libertarian free even though they are independent of any space-time context.

There is also, perhaps, a stranger way in which we can conceive of this relationship of free choices in a space-time context and a physically deterministic world. I should note that I’m not entirely sure whether this is coherent (it may run into unforeseen problems which more extensive analysis could tease out), but my suspicion is that it is coherent (and, therefore, logically possible). We might imagine that the context in which a libertarian free choice is made is physically under-determinative, but that, once a free decision is made, the result is that the world is supplied physical properties which make that decision appear physically determined. Here we have to imagine that free decisions occur with a limited space-time context (an under-determinative one), and that backwards causation is possible (i.e., events from the future can cause things in the past). Then, we might imagine that even though a temporally antecedent state of affairs P1 causally determines that P2 occurs next, a person’s free choice after the time at which P1 is the case, and before the time at which P2 is the case, is the sufficient reason P1 has the causally determinative features it has for bringing P2 about. On this view, a libertarian free agent makes a decision in light of an under-determinative slice of P1, and their making a decision has temporally backwards-reaching effects which supply P1 with all the physical features necessary for it to deterministically bring P2 about. On this view, a libertarian free decision can be the sufficient reason why P1 deterministically brings P2 about, even though P2 is HECP explained adequately in terms of P1 alone. This view is strange only because we generally think of causal sequences as parallel with temporal sequences, but, at least on the B-theory of time, there is no reason causal antecedence and temporal antecedence need to go hand-in-hand; my free decision may (atemporally) cause features of the past, and maybe those features physically-deterministically cause events in the future.

The Temporal Sequence: P1 → Fn → P2

The (atemporal) Causal Sequence: P1* → Fn → P1 → P2

In conclusion then, we still have no good arguments for believing either in determinism per se, nor in physical determinism. Moreover, even if physical determinism were true, we would have, it seems, no good reasons to doubt the fact that we are libertarian free, at least if we accept the possibility of temporally backwards causation (and, therefore, the B-theory). This can more easily be seen when we distinguish the HECP from the PSR, and note the two different levels of explanations which satisfy them. The PSR needn’t be true, but explanations of the kind it demands, if even possible, carve out a space for libertarian-free decisions even in a physically deterministic world.

[1] For further reading on this point, see Koons, Robert C., and George Bealer, eds. The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press, 2010.

[2] I cited the Copenhagen theory of quantum mechanics, as well as John Norton’s now famous example of a ball on a dome (in the comments section, in response to a reader), which illustrates that even Newtonian mechanics is not entirely deterministic. I could easily have added (though I did not think to) that Newton’s laws were all stipulated for closed systems anyway, and it is no part of those laws as such to stipulate that the physical universe as a whole is a closed system, so that his laws cannot imply physical determinism. Newtonian physics did not preclude God’s intervention in the world, for instance, and this is precisely why Newton was not being inconsistent when he maintained both that his laws were true, and that God occasionally intervened in the physical world (for instance by providing the planets with an extra ‘push’ every now and again). This demonstrates clearly that Newton’s laws, even if they were deterministic for closed systems (which the ball-on-dome example disproves), wouldn’t come anywhere near to entailing physical determinism.

[3] Not all sound arguments are good arguments, for the soundness of an argument is neither a necessary, nor sufficient, condition of the goodness of an argument (just as the goodness of an argument is neither necessary nor sufficient for soundness). I will discuss this distinction in more detail in an upcoming post. For now, however, observe that if this argument were sound, then it would give us good reasons for accepting its conclusion, or at least for accepting premise 5.

[4] Calvinism requires a compatibilist view of free will and determinism in order to allow normative statements about what one ought or ought not to believe, but I’m not convinced that such accounts are even coherent. In fact, I am convinced they are not.

[5] Pruss quoted a passage from Hume, but I have provided a more extended excerpt of the same passage from Hume. David Hume, “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion” in Modern Philosophy: An Anthology (Second Edition), Edited by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), 622.

[6] At first I thought, in passing, that if somebody had trouble with the idea of an infinite past I could just say that there was a world W* in which temporally backward causation (i.e., causation from future events to past ones) is the only kind of causal relation which obtains, and where every event is deterministically caused by some posterior event, and although the world has a temporal beginning, it has no temporal end. However, one should only be concerned with actually infinite regresses of past events if one is i) an A-theorist, or ii) worried about infinite chains of causes. If one is an A-theorist, they will not likely accept the possibility of backward causation anyway, and if one is, like me, worried about infinite chains of causes, then they will have the same problem with W* as they had with W. If you, like me, do have a problem with accepting that W is logically possible then either suspend your modal suspicions here for the sake of argument, or just notice that any length of time can be infinitely subdivided, so that over any measurable length of time it is logically possible that an infinite number of causes are at play just in case it is true that there is no particular time tn at which no cause can logically possibly obtain.

[7] I strongly believe they can be sufficiently explained, and this is because I adamantly reject the assumption that all explanations can be reduced to, or expressed by, entailments. However, I will leave off giving an account of this highly contentious position for now; the reader who disagrees with me is invited to accept the weaker conditional claim that if facts about libertarian free actions could be sufficiently explained, then any combination of libertarian free acts might figure into a sufficient explanation for precisely why the physical states of the universe are precisely as they are. However, notice that, for the purposes of my argument, the PSR needn’t be true, it just needs to be possible that there be an underlying explanation which goes beyond the demands of the HECP.


5 thoughts on “A Scientistic argument for Determinism, and some related thoughts

  1. If we are to believe that matter cannot spontaneously come into being from nothingness, then something has to be eternal, either God or “stuff-in-motion” or something else. Personally, I think that “stuff-in-motion” is sufficient. Stuff includes matter in all its possible forms. Motion includes all forms of movement as well as the transformations of matter into different forms (for example: super condensed in black holes which transform by “big bangs” into universes and atoms of hydrogen and oxygen becoming molecules of water).

    In any case, the evidence of determinism is empirical observation of the reliability of cause and effect. Science discovers the rules by which the effects of gravity can be reliably predicted. Medicine discovers the causes of diseases and learns how to prevent or cure them.

    The logical implication of reliable cause and effect is universal inevitability (your chain of interdependent states (W) across all times (t)). Everything will happen in a single inevitable way. But “inevitable” does not mean “beyond our control”, because we do in fact determine what happens next by our own choices.

    The only way that determinism threatens free will is when we imagine ourselves to be somehow separate from reliable cause and effect. This illusion of separateness creates an existential fear that we are the victims of causes forcing us to act against our natural will. But this separateness is an illusion. We are purposeful causal agents, bending other forces of nature to our own needs and purposes. Our deliberate choices and actions actually determine what happens next. We get to choose what becomes inevitable.

    I don’t think there is any reason to step outside of causation to do this. In fact, our freedom to cause anything requires reliable cause and effect. Without determinism our will is impotent and irrelevant.

    We’ve discussed time travel before. I think there is only a single actual time, now. The past is our records of prior “now’s” and the future is our imagination of upcoming “now’s”. But I love time travel stories.

    (P.S. As a Pragmatist, I love item 6)

    • Hello again Marvin Edwards,

      I hope you won’t mind me saying that your comments are a little too familiar. I’m a little disappointed to see that almost everything you have said in your latest comment you have also said elsewhere. You seem to be repeating yourself. Your points are even ordered in approximately the same sequence. It’s almost as though this is, for you, a little like a dogmatic mantra which, if repeated often enough, lulls the mind into a false sense of satisfaction. For instance, you say (again):
      “The logical implication of reliable cause and effect is universal inevitability[.]”

      Not only have you said this before (multiple times), but this is, as I have explained before, simply not true unless by ‘reliable’ you mean something much more than statistical reliability or nomic regularity, but then you may as well have said that the logical implication of inevitability is inevitability. That’s about as insightful as saying that a tautology is a tautology. In addition (to repeat myself), science only offers nomic regularities, and not laws in the sense that you require here, so that to affirm (even physical) determinism is to take a philosophical step well beyond science itself. I won’t belabour the point, however, because everything you have said here about determinism and free will I have already responded to elsewhere, and I have found your arguments unpersuasive for significant philosophical reasons.

      You say: “If we are to believe that matter cannot spontaneously come into being from nothingness, then something has to be eternal, either God or “stuff-in-motion” or something else. Personally, I think that “stuff-in-motion” is sufficient.”

      To think that stuff in motion is a good enough explanation of the fact that matter, space, time and energy came into existence a finite time ago is possibly confused, for if ‘stuff-in-motion’ can bring about physically observable effects then that stuff would, it seems to me, have to be physical stuff in some sense, so that our universe is part of a physical multiverse or something of that sort. I am convinced, however, that the multiverse hypothesis is simply confused. However, supposing that it isn’t confused, it seems to me that stuff in motion would only satisfy principles like the HECP, but not the PSR. If we want a sufficient explanation for why there is stuff in motion at all we need to turn to a necessary being (for note that even if stuff had always been in motion, that wouldn’t do anything to make it a necessary fact that stuff is in motion, but sufficient reason requires, at the end of the day, some necessary fact which explains, without entailing, a contingent one). God’s being eternal isn’t what makes Theism a good explanation here – the key is God’s being metaphysically necessary.

      • By “eternal” I mean that there never was an absence of material, such that it never had to come “into existence a finite time ago”. And it has eternally been in motion and transformation from one form into another, in a reliable fashion. For example, the super-massive, super-condensed black hole was all the stuff in our visible universe, just in a different form, prior to its natural transformation during the last “big bang”.

        The sufficient reason for such a theory is that we look out the window and there it is, stuff in motion.

        Time comes with reliable motion (Sun coming up each morning = 1 day). Space comes with reliable distance between stuff. Neither time nor space requires creation. They are about how we organize our observation of stuff and its motions in our heads.

        The reliability of cause and effect is tested each day as I get out of bed and walk to the kitchen. The gravity of the Earth is familiar in the pressure on the bottoms of my feet. My steps reliably transport me forward to the sink. The water flows downward from the faucet rather than up to the ceiling. That is empirical evidence of reliable cause and effect.

        If each step I took produced a different effect, like transport to another continent rather than a short distance down the hallway, then I’d have a case against reliable cause and effect.

      • I follow Leibniz here; a thing’s having existed for an infinite amount of time does nothing to explain why there is something rather than nothing unless it is a necessary fact that that thing exists. In the case of matter, there is no necessity about it’s existence, and so positing ‘eternal’ matter does absolutely nothing to explain why there is something rather than nothing.

      • Right. And I’m questioning the intuition that there was ever nothingness at the start. The fact of “something” combined with “nothing can come from nothing” suggests that “something” was always there. And our intuition would be wrong.

        There’s this theory, that you probably know much better than I, about “emergence”. A complex system arises where the system is more than a sum of its parts. The human mind would be a person emerging from a biological organism, which in turn emerges from inanimate matter. There is nothing in inanimate matter that would suggest life. Nevertheless, life emerges. And nothing in bacterial life would suggest a human mind, and yet mind emerges. Anyway, its all over my head.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s